Michigan Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 6

1941

TAXATION - JURISDICTION TO TAX THE EQUITABLE INTEREST
OF A TRUST BENEFICIARY
Rex B. Martin
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local
Commons

Recommended Citation
Rex B. Martin, TAXATION - JURISDICTION TO TAX THE EQUITABLE INTEREST OF A TRUST BENEFICIARY,
39 MICH. L. REV. 1044 (1941).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol39/iss6/25

This Regular Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1044

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

TAXATION - JURISDICTION TO TAX THE EQUITABLE INTEREST OF A
TRUST BENEFICIARY - Pennsylvania levied a property tax on a resident beneficiary's equitable interest in a New York trust. The settlor 0£ the trust, a New
York resident, had created the trust there and both the trustee and the stocks
and bonds comprising the corpus were in that state. The beneficiary had no control over the disposition or management of the corpus and was entitled merely
to the income of the trust for her life. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
the tax. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, in a per curiam
decision without opinion, that the state court's decision should be affirmed.
Stewart v. Pennsylvania, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 445, affirming Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 A. (2d) 444 (1940).
Since the Union Refrigerator Tramit Co. case in 1905,1 the Supreme Court
has been attempting to crystallize the limiting effects of the Fourteenth Amendment on the state's power to tax. At one time a majority of the Court were persuaded that there could be no constitutional taxation of the same interest in
property by two states at the same time.2 To determine which state had jurisdiction to tax, the Court seized upon the mechanical concept of "situs" of the
property.3 It was easy to apply this principle to realty and tangible personalty, but
the concept presented serious problems when applied to intangibles. Starting with

1 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36
(1905).
2 The strong dicta in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280
U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929), became the court'& position in Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U.S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930); First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S.
312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932); Beidler v. South Carolina. Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1, 51
S. Ct. 54 (1930); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 800 (1935).
3 See Justice McReyrrolds' opinion in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929).
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the invalidity of "double taxation" as a major premise, the Court was harassed
by the necessity of discovering a "situs" for intangible property which lacked
any spatial quality and therefore could hardly be said to have any definite
geographical location. 4 Justice Stone, however, refusing to accept the doctrine
that double taxation was unconstitutional, had determinedly insisted that a state's
power to tax was limited, not by an artificial doctrine of situs, but by the state's
control over and benefit to the interest taxed. 5 The present Supreme Court
apparently recognized the validity of Justice Stone's position in Curry v. McCanless,6 where a state was permitted to tax the exercise of a power of appointment by a resident decedent although the appointment operated on a trust fund
in another state which also taxed the transfer. In 1925 the Court, somewhat
troubled by possibilities of double taxation, had overruled a Virginia tax on the
corpus of a Maryland trust held for the benefit of a Virginia citizen.7 In that
and subsequent cases, however, although denying the validity of double taxes,
the Court had expressly refused to consider whether or not the domiciliary state
of a beneficiary could constitutionally tax his equitable interests in a trust whose
corpus, trustee and powers of management were all outside the state. 8 The
4
Lowndes, "Spurious Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation," 47
HARV. L. REV. 628 (1934); Lowndes, "Bases of Jurisdiction in State Taxation of
Inheritances and Property," 29 M1cH. L. REV. 850 (1931). "As the present is not a
tax on the debt, but only on the transfer of it, neither the analogies drawn from the
law of property taxes nor the attempt to solve the present problem by ascribing to a
legal relationship unconnected with any physical thing, a fictitious situs, can, I think,
carry us far toward a solution," stated Justice Stone, concurring in Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 at 215, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930).
5
Notice should be taken of Justice Stone's persistence when he concurred in Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929), and
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98 (1930); when
he dissented in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436 (1930), in First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932), and in
Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 800 (1935); when he wrote the opinion
of the court in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939), and in
Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383, 59 S. Ct. 913 (1939).
6
307 U.S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939). See the comment in 38 M1cH. L. REV.
81 (1939).
1
See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct.
59 (1929), where Justice McReynolds feared double taxation, Justice Stone saw no
protection being offered, and Justice Holmes dissented. For a good exposition of the
cases up to 1935, see Brown, "Multiple Taxation by the States-What Is Left of It?"
48 HARV. L. REv. 407 (1935).
8
Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36
( 190 5), expressly reserved the question of taxing any intangibles. In Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 at 92, 50 S. Ct. 59 (1929), Justice
McReynolds said, "The power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the fair value of any
interest in the securities actually owned by one of her resident citizens is not now presented for consideration." Justice Stone, 280 U. S. at 95, stated, "But the question
whether the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a tax on the beneficiaries, in Virginia,
where they are domiciled, measured by their equitable interests, seems to me not to be
presented..•." In Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 at 215,
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Pennsylvania statute in the principal case carefully accepts the loophole suggested and taxes only the equitable title of the beneficiary. Although its reasons
for allowing the tax are not stated, the Court may have concluded that there
was no double taxation since Pennsylvania taxed only the beneficial interest
and New York could tax only the legal title. In light of the McCanless decision,
however, it appears more probable that Justice Stone's theories have completely
prevailed. Double taxation may be unsound economically, but it is difficult to
discover anything in the Fourteenth Amendment preventing it. 9 In the absence
of express constitutional limitations, a state should be able to tax any property
or any transfer to which it gives some benefit or protection.10 The historical
limitations on the power to tax realty and tangible personalty hardly need be
disturbed by the Court's conclusion.11 The Supreme Court has upheld a Wisconsin inheritance tax on a resident decedent's Illinois trust,12 a property tax by
Kentucky on a resident's bank account in Missouri,18 a Connecticut inheritance
tax on an interest in a New York partnership and a Connecticut tax on bonds
in New Y ork.14 If these intangible interests are sufficiently protected by the state
so that jurisdiction to tax exists, the equitable interest in a trust should also be
taxable, whether or not that interest is accompanied by a power to dispose of the
legal or equitable title. If the McCanless case did not entirely destroy the doctrine of "double taxation," the principal case indicates an easy method of escaping its possible application. If, on the other hand, the doctrine was completely
destroyed, the principal case is an illustrative though silent climax to Justice
Stone's protracted endeavor to remove the Fourteenth Amendment as an oppressive limitation on the state's judisdiction to tax.
Rex B. Martin

50 S. Ct. 98 (1930), Justice Stone said, "there are ••. too many situations in which
a single economic interest may have such legal relationships with different taxing
jurisdictions as to justify its taxation in both••••"
9
Justice Stone's dissent in First National Bank of Boston V:· Maine, 284 U. S.
312 at 334, 52 S. Ct. 174 (1932), stated, "The capital objection to it is that the due
process clause is made the basis for withholding from a state the power to tax interests
subject to its control and benefited by its laws; such! control and benefit are together
the ultimate and indubitable justification of all taxation." If the Fifth Amendment's
due process clause does not prevent double taxation by the federal government, it is
difficult to see why the same clause in the Fourteenth Amendment should contain
that limitation in regard to state taxes. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct.
457 (1933).
10
A state can exert its taxing power "in relation to opportunities which it has
given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits, which it has conferred. • • ."
Justice Frankfurter in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 246
at 250.
11
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900 (1939).
12
Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473 (1916).
18 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, Kentucky, 245 U. S. 54,
38 S. Ct. 40 (1917).
14
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410 (1928).

